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November 13, 2006

Collapse corollary (The Militarization of Peace)

Today Taqiyya or adhering to the logic of a Takfiri connects survival of a believer who conceals his practice and belief that is the way of the warrior under Taqiyya to a catastrophic consequence for the enemies’ community in which survival of individuals or collectives particularly the very existence of native and indigenous entities must turn into an object of police curiosity or even liquidation, because the hostile entities who exploit Taqiyya practice and revere everything but their own systems, they populate every niche and land but their own.

It is not the extremist under Taqiyya who is targeted as the object of eradication and assault but potential hosts or the positions (niches) which can be occupied by him; and if the survival in a hostile environment is the mere reason of the Takfiri’s Taqiyya and parasitic activities aiming at civilians, then it becomes an imperative task for constabularies to shift the direction of the hunt to survival in general as the threatening subject, probing everywhere that an attempt for survival takes place. In the presence of a warrior under Taqiyya who just tries to survive, becoming the native civilian of the hostile society does not only render the event of ‘being a civilian’ (civilian-hood) menacing but also forms a polarity in the society which is the polarity of the State and insurgent militia (sabotaged civilianhood), a polarity which moves on the corkscrew of escalation and diffusion. Every suspect Jihadi who is eliminated by the State results in stronger attempts for survival from the Jihadi under Taqiyya which in turn leads to a more powerful Taqiyya, that is to say, diffusing among new hosts to a higher degree as well as increasing the potentiality of being a Jihadi through every civilian or native host (recrudescence in the sense of disease). The State’s wholesome reaction to such an outbreak and incursion through civilians intrinsically begins with a social tenement (isolating suspect civilians from the rest of society) which tends to capture civilianhood within the tractable matrix of taxonomic framing of the social body. This event manifests itself in the rise of ethno-religious quarantines which are less rigid and segregative than ghettos because they are not addressed in themselves (as in anti-Semitic or apartheid ghettos of Warsaw and Johannesburg) but in relation to the politics of civilianhood. However, this event is strong enough to take the form of an inter-society exodus, or return to the minority side of each civilian (minority subsistence instead of social wholesomeness). Because of the Takfiri’s minority or religious and ethnic peculiarities, this minority fission that creates a perforated population (hence with a different behavior towards the forces of territoriality) is happening more on the side of religion than anything else.

“the deepest secrets of religion lie in its minorities” (ibn Maimun)

A Jihadi who has undertaken Taqiyya completely and in every aspect overlaps the citizen, the voiceless, the ordinary, the friendly, the inconsequential by shutting down all his conflictive and war fueled activities. By becoming one with citizens who exist as expendable entities for the State, the warrior under Taqiyya shifts the battlefield to the homeland and conjures the attention of the State and its instruments of policing to citizens rather than outside forces. This hypercamouflage or Taqiyya gives a voice to the voiceless (civilian that is), a voice which is in fact the voice of the warrior under Taqiyya or the logic of hypercamouflage. If the best war machine is an expendable warmachine, then civilian as a citizen who is expendable and replaceable for the State exactly because of the policies and the order of the State, becomes an expendable warmachine, that is to say, the best war machine against the State in the wake of Taqiyya or hypercamouflage. The warrior under Taqiyya does not possess civilians or citizens of the hostile community; he becomes ‘one of them’ in every sense even if becoming one of them practically opposes his beliefs and pragmatic assumptions. Only by becoming one of them or being possessed by all positions and characteristics of a citizen or a civilian of a hostile community – the very opposite of possessing civilians – the Taqiyya practitioner can undermine the citizenship or civilian-hood (both its State-dictated inconsequentiality and harmlessness) and the State itself. This is nothing but the machinery of Revolution, twisted from the beginning, epidemic to the end.

Posted by Incognitum at November 13, 2006 03:52 PM